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WHO MAY WE DETAIN AND HOW:  LESSONS 
FROM POST 9/11 ENEMY COMBATANT 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR NEW YORK’S CIVIL 




[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United 
States to every person within its jurisdiction does not 
import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times 
and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint.  
There are manifold restraints to which every person is 
necessarily subject for the common good.  On any other 
basis organized society could not exist with safety to its 
members.1
Theodore Sypnier, a 100-year-old man from New York, was 
recently put behind bars for failing to comply with parole 
conditions stemming from his sixty year history of molesting 
children.
 
2  It was the second time he violated his parole.3  His 
youngest daughter has pleaded with local and state lawmakers to 
civilly confine her father, despite his advanced age, because she 
feels that he will almost certainly reoffend if he is out on the 
streets.4  Mr. Sypnier contends that he is too old for treatment.5
 
† J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2008, The 
George Washington University. I would like to thank Professor John Q. Barrett for 
his many hours of help with this Note and for being an invaluable mentor. Thank 
you, also, to my family—without you, none of it would be possible.  
  
1 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1997) (citing Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905)).  
2 Lou Michel, 100-Year-Old Pedophile Sent Back to Jail, THE BUFFALO NEWS, 
Jan. 26, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.buffalonews.com/incoming/article 
31528.ece. 
3 Id.  
4 See id.  
5 Id. 
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However, a psychotherapist familiar with Mr. Sypnier’s case said 
that “he will likely continue to present a risk to the community.  
If he isn’t a candidate for civil confinement, I don’t know who is.”6
Civil confinement
  
7 laws allow states to commit sex offenders 
after their terms of incarceration are completed.8  The decision to 
civilly confine sex offenders occurs after they have served their 
time in prison.  The Supreme Court has addressed the 
constitutionality of civil confinement laws in two decisions 
regarding a Kansas statute.9  These cases established that 
involuntary detention of dangerous mentally ill sex offenders is 
constitutionally authorized, so long as due process requirements 
are met.10
New York recently passed its own civil confinement statute, 
the Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act (“SOMTA”), 
which closely resembles the Kansas statute.  Although the 
Supreme Court spoke directly on the civil confinement of sexual 
offenders in the context of the Kansas statute, New York’s 
similar civil confinement law has been attacked on constitutional 
grounds.
   
11  Since the Supreme Court has stated that detention of 
mentally ill and dangerous sex offenders is authorized and that 
civil confinement statutes are facially valid, those challenging 
the New York Act focus their objections on certain provisions 
that they find to be procedurally deficient.12
 
6 Id.  
  Litigants contend 
that “specific aspects of the regime [that the Act] creates fail to 
7 The terms “civil confinement” and “civil commitment” shall be used 
interchangeably throughout this Note.  
8 See Richard G. Wright, Sex Offender Post-Incarceration Sanctions: Are There 
Any Limits?, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 17, 38–39 (2008) 
(discussing the history and progression of civil commitment for sex offenders in the 
United States).  
9 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 
(1997); see also discussion infra Part I.C.  
10 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356, 369–71 (holding that the civil confinement statute 
did not violate substantive due process and rejecting the offender’s claims that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause or ex post facto issues were implicated); see also infra Part 
I.C.  
11 See Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Spitzer, No. 07-Civ-2935, 2007 WL 
4115936, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007) (focusing on procedural, and not 
substantive, due process), aff’d sub nom. Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v. Paterson, 
No. 07-Civ-5548, 2009 WL 579445 (2d Cir. Mar. 04, 2009). “Plaintiffs do not 
challenge New York’s [ultimate] authority to involuntarily commit individuals who 
have in the past committed sexual crimes and are at present mentally ill and 
dangerous.” Id. at *6.  
12 See id.  
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provide the requisite procedural safeguards necessary to comport 
with the constitutional command that persons may not be 
deprived of liberty without due process of law.”13  In other states, 
legal challenges to civil confinement laws have been accompanied 
by commentary and academic literature denouncing the 
practice.14
Although the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the 
Kansas statute upheld the constitutionality of civil confinement, 
this method of addressing the social problem of sex offenders 
faces criticism.  One of the concerns is that many states are using 
the ambiguity of the decisions to ignore the Supreme Court’s 
holding in crafting and upholding their civil commitment 
statutes.
  It is likely that the challenges in other states are 
indicative of those that the New York Act will face.  Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court’s decision to hear challenges to the same civil 
confinement statute twice within a five year period signifies the 
controversial nature of the issue.   
15
After the September 11 attacks on the United States in 2001, 
Congress quickly passed a resolution authorizing the President 
to “use all necessary and appropriate force” against those 
connected to the attacks.
  This Note proposes that another line of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, the decisions addressing enemy combatants 
detained in Guantanamo Bay, provides a basis upon which the 
New York civil confinement law can be analyzed. Additionally, 
the Note offers a response to potential statutory challenges that 




13 Id. at *1.  
  The conflict that followed was, and 
14 See generally Eric S. Janus, The Preventative State, Terrorists, and Sexual 
Predators: Countering the Threat of a New Outsider Jurisprudence, 40 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 576 (2004) (pointing out the dangers of civil confinement and negative 
constitutional implications); Todd M. Grossman, Comment, Kansas v. Hendricks: 
The Diminishing Role of Treatment in the Involuntary Civil Confinement of Sexually 
Dangerous Persons, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 475 (1999) (suggesting that adequate 
treatment is a necessary component of civil commitment); Allison Morgan, Note, 
Civil Confinement of Sex Offenders: New York’s Attempt To Push the Envelope in the 
Name of Public Safety, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1001 (2006) (discussing the possibility that 
states are creating a group of second-class citizens with fewer rights than the rest of 
us). 
15 See Peter C. Pfaffenroth, Note, The Need for Coherence: States’ Civil 
Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
2229, 2248–50 (2003). 
16 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)).  
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continues to be, an unconventional “war” on terror.  When 
individuals captured by the military were sent to Guantanamo 
Bay, legal challenges to their detention arose.  Starting in 2004, 
and continuing until the present, the Supreme Court grappled 
with the question of what protections should be afforded to these 
individuals, termed “enemy combatants” by the Government.17
This Note argues that the post 9/11 enemy combatant cases 
are an appropriate lens through which to examine and ultimately 
defend the constitutionality of New York’s civil confinement 
statute.  Although civilly confining sex offenders and detaining 
enemy combatants are in part motivated by different concerns, it 
has been argued that these “two powerful streams of 
contemporary American public policy are converging on a single 
idea”: identifying a dangerous class of persons and incapacitating 




17 The four relevant cases, in chronological order, are Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding that a United States citizen held as an “enemy 
combatant [must] be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for 
[his] detention”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484–85 (2004) (establishing that 
federal courts have jurisdiction to hear detention challenges from foreign nationals); 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 560 (2006) (finding that the military 
commissions created by the Executive Branch violated the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice and the Geneva Convention); and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 
(2008) (holding that aliens detained as enemy combatants were entitled to the 
privilege of habeas corpus).  
  The 
9/11 cases illustrate that above a constitutionally minimum 
“floor” of due process requirements, which includes notice and 
opportunity to be heard, the political branches are free to craft 
procedures for detaining certain classes of individuals as they see 
fit.  Three principles emerge with respect to both enemy 
combatants detained by the United States military and sex 
offenders civilly committed by the New York statute.  These 
principles are first suggested in the civil confinement cases, and 
reinforced and clarified by the Guantanamo cases.  First, it is 
difficult to draw bright-line rules in both areas, and in the 
absence of these rules, the political branches must draft 
legislation that meets the constitutional minimums.  Second, the 
Court is willing to defer to these legislative judgments on how to 
best craft methods to detain individuals, so long as established  
 
 
18 Janus, supra note 14, at 576.   
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due process requirements are met.  Finally, incapacitation for the 
purpose of preventing future harm is a legitimate goal of 
confinement in both instances.  
Part I of this Note discusses the passage and provisions of 
the New York Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act.  It 
also provides a brief discussion of the two Supreme Court cases 
directly addressing civil confinement of sex offenders.  Part II 
analyzes how the 9/11 enemy combatant cases can be used to 
determine the constitutionality of the New York statute.  Part III 
considers some actual and potential challenges to the New York 
law, with responses drawn from the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court’s detainee cases.  
I. CIVIL CONFINEMENT IN NEW YORK 
This Part discusses the passage of New York’s civil 
confinement law and includes a synopsis of the Act’s key 
provisions.  It also provides a brief summary and analysis of the 
Supreme Court’s two recent civil confinement cases: Kansas v. 
Hendricks19 and Kansas v. Crane.20
A. New York Passes a Civil Confinement Statute for Sex 
Offenders 
 
New York’s civil confinement statute was the product of the 
legislative branch’s struggle to take a tough stance against sex 
offenders and the judiciary’s response to this goal.  In 2005, 
without a specific law in place to govern the procedure, Governor 
Pataki unilaterally ordered that more than two-dozen sex 
offenders with imminent release dates be committed using 
current state laws.  His actions were challenged:  The former 
prisoners who were involuntarily committed filed a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus.21
The case went up to the Court of Appeals, which gave a 
“sharp rebuke” to the Governor and struck down the 
confinements.
 
22  In State ex rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio,23
 
19 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 the 
20 534 U.S. 407 (2002).  
21 See State ex rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio, 10 Misc. 3d 851, 858, 809 N.Y.S.2d 836, 
841 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2005) (granting petition in part).  
22 See Nicholas Confessore, Court Rebukes Pataki on Confining Sex Offenders 
After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2006, at B1. 
23 7 N.Y.3d 607, 859 N.E.2d 508, 825 N.Y.S.2d 702 (2006). 
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unanimous court held that Pataki’s use of existing mental 
hygiene laws was improper, because the offenders were in the 
custody of the state’s Department of Correctional Services at the 
time.24  The court found that in “the absence of specific statutory 
authority governing the release of felony offenders from prison to 
a psychiatric hospital,” the corrections law should have been 
followed.25  In striking down Pataki’s confinements, the court 
recognized that he had acted “in an attempt to protect the 
community from violent sexual predators,” and the judges did 
“not propose that these petitioners be released.”26  The court also 
noted that it did not want “to trump the interests of public 
safety.”27  The opinion almost reads as an instruction to the 
legislature:  If you want to do this, then pass a law.  New York 
legislators responded, and on April 13, 2007, they passed The Sex 
Offender Management and Treatment Act.28  The Act was passed 
as “a balanced response to a compelling need.”29  The compelling 
need identified was “to protect [New York] residents . . . from sex 
criminals whose recidivism is predictable and uncontrollable.”30
B. The Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act 
  
Balanced against this compelling need were due process 
concerns, which require, at a minimum, notice and opportunity to 
be heard.  The following section describes the procedures put in 
place by SOMTA in order to realize these requirements.  
In passing the Act, the legislature found that recidivistic sex 
offenders posed a danger to society that had thus far been 
inadequately addressed through the existing criminal 
framework.31
 
24 Id. at 610, 859 N.E.2d at 509, 825 N.Y.S.2d at 703. 
  The legislative findings repeatedly emphasized 
that the Act was designed for both treatment of the offenders and  
 
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 614, 859 N.E.2d at 512, 825 N.Y.S.2d at 706. 
27 Id. (also “recogniz[ing] that a need for continued hospitalization may well 
exist”).  
28 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01 (McKinney 2010).  
29 Introducer’s Memorandum in Support, Bill Jacket, ch. 7, L. 2007, 2007 S.B. 
3318 (Westlaw). 
30 Id.  
31 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01(a). 
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for the protection of the community.32
1. Sex Offenders Affected by SOMTA 
  This Section identifies the 
key provisions of SOMTA and describes the three step process for 
civil confinement in New York. 
The Act creates two classes of offenders: those who are to be 
physically confined and those who are to be subject to strict 
supervision.  It provides that individuals who pose a greater 
threat to society will be detained in secure facilities, while those 
who are capable of living in the community will be monitored 
under a system of strict supervision.  The general “sex offender 
requiring civil management” is a detained sex offender who 
suffers from a mental abnormality.33  In New York, a “mental 
abnormality” denotes  “a congenital or acquired condition, 
disease or disorder that affects the emotional, cognitive, or 
volitional capacity of a person in a manner that predisposes him 
or her to the commission of conduct constituting a sex offense and 
that results in that person having serious difficulty in controlling 
such conduct.”34
“[d]angerous sex offender requiring confinement” means a 
person who is a detained sex offender suffering from a mental 
abnormality involving such a strong predisposition to commit 
sex offenses, and such an inability to control behavior, that the 
person is likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex 
offenses if not confined to a secure treatment facility.
  Whereas a 
35
 
32 See generally id. § 10.01. The integrated approach should “provide meaningful 
treatment and . . . protect the public.” Id. § 10.01(a). Confinement should be 
extended by the civil process to provide the offender with treatment and “protect the 
public from [the offender’s] recidivistic conduct.” Id. § 10.01(b).  The goal should be 
to “protect the public, reduce recidivism, and ensure offenders have access to proper 
treatment.” Id. § 10.01(c). The system “must be designed for treatment and 
protection.” Id. § 10.01(e). 
   
33 Id. § 10.03(q). 
34 Id. § 10.03(i). 
35 Id. § 10.03(e). There are currently two secure facilities for sex offenders in 
New York: Central New York Psychiatric Center, near Utica, and St. Lawrence 
Psychiatric Center, near Ogdensburg. See OFF. N.Y. ST. ATT’Y GEN., THE SEX 
OFFENDER MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT ACT: THE FIRST YEAR: A REPORT ON THE 
2007 LAW THAT ESTABLISHED CIVIL MANAGEMENT FOR SEX OFFENDERS, at 8, 
[hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT], available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/ 
bureaus/sexual_offender/pdfs/April%202008%20Yearly%20Report.pdf. 
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An offender who requires strict supervision36 also suffers from a 
mental abnormality but does not require confinement because it 
has been decided that he can live safely in the community.37  If 
the offender violates the conditions of his supervision, he may be 
placed in a secure treatment facility.38
2. The Civil Confinement Process in New York 
 
To ensure procedural protections, the civil confinement 
process under the Act takes place in three stages: a review of the 
case, a probable cause hearing before a judge, and a trial before a 
jury.39  Complex “safeguards are necessary to ensure that the 
respondent’s legal rights are respected and that decisions to 
civilly manage individuals withstand legal scrutiny.”40
The first stage of the process begins when any detained sex 
offender is nearing the end of his incarceration; at this time, 
notice is given to the Attorney General’s Office.
   
41  The case is 
then referred to the Office of Mental Health (“OMH”).  OMH is 
responsible for reviewing every case and making a 
recommendation.42  The case review panel, located within OMH, 
must consist of at least fifteen members, and each case should be 
reviewed by three members.43
 
36 “Strict and Intensive Supervision and Treatment” is intended for offenders 
“who can, with supervision and support, live safely in the community.” ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 35, at 7. It is supervised by parole officers with a 
case ratio of ten to one—a normal caseload in the state is sixty to one, and a normal 
sex offender caseload is twenty-five to one. Id. Offenders are also required to have 
six face-to-face contacts and six collateral contacts each month. Id. Other conditions 
imposed specifically relate to the offenders risk factors and prior behavior: for 
example, that he may not have contact with minors, or he may not use a computer. 
Id. Offenders are also required to attend treatment sessions and are subject to drug 
testing and polygraph examinations. Id. 
  The Act requires that “[a]t least 
two members of each team shall be professionals in the field of 
37 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(r) (McKinney 2010).  
38 See id. § 10.11(d)(1) (stating that the parole officer must have “reasonable 
cause to believe that the person has violated a condition”). 
39 See id. §§ 10.05–.07.  
40 See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 35, at 5.  
41 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.05(b). Although the Act states that notice shall 
be given to the Attorney General “at least one hundred twenty days prior to the 
person’s anticipated release,” it also maintains that failure to give notice within the 
prescribed time period “shall not affect the validity of such notice or any subsequent 
action.” Id. 
42 See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 35, at 4.  
43 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.05(a). 
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mental health.”44  The case team is responsible for looking over 
medical, clinical, criminal, or institutional records, as well as 
actuarial risk assessment instruments and reports provided by 
the district attorney.45  If the team finds that the offender is a sex 
offender requiring civil management, the case is referred to the 
Attorney General for litigation.46  In the first year, 139 of the 
1,603 cases reviewed by OMH were referred to the Attorney 
General.47
The second stage of the process is a petition and hearing 
before a judge.
 
48  At any time prior to the trial, the Attorney 
General may request a court order that the respondent submit to 
a psychiatric evaluation performed by an examiner of the State’s 
choosing.49  In addition, the respondent may obtain an evaluation 
by a psychiatrist of his own choosing.50  At the hearing, the judge 
must determine “whether there is probable cause to believe that 
the respondent is a sex offender requiring civil management.”51  
At the hearing, the offender’s prior commission of a sex offense is 
deemed established and will not be relitigated, even if he was 
found not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect, or 
was incompetent to stand trial.52  If the court determines that 
there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is a sex 
offender requiring civil management, he remains in the custody 
of the state and a date is set for a jury trial.53
 
44 Id.  
 
45 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.05(d). The offender’s file is first reviewed by 
a multidisciplinary staff, who may then refer it to a case review team. In the first 
year 1,603 detained offenders were reviewed by the staff. Of these, 274 went on to a 
case review team. Out of the 274, 139 were ultimately referred to the Attorney 
General for litigation. See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 35. 
46 The Act requires that the case review team provide its referral to the Attorney 
General within forty-five days of receiving the notice of the offender’s anticipated 
release, but again, the failure to do so within the appropriate time period does not 
affect the continuation of the process. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.05(g). 
47 See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 35.  
48 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.06. The attorney general should “seek to file 
the petition within thirty days after receiving notice of the case review team’s 
finding.” Id. § 10.06(a). 
49 Id. § 10.06(d). 
50 Id. § 10.06(e).  
51 Id. § 10.06(g). A “sex offender requiring civil management . . . is a detained 
sex offender who suffers from a mental abnormality.” See id. § 10.03(q).  
52 Id. § 10.06(j).  
53 Id. § 10.06(k).  
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The third and final step of the process is a jury trial, in the 
same court that conducted the probable cause hearing.54  The 
purpose of the trial is to “determine whether the respondent is a 
detained sex offender who suffers from a mental abnormality.”55  
Unlike the probable cause hearing, at trial, the jury must make 
this determination “by clear and convincing evidence,” and the 
Attorney General litigating the case has the burden of proof.56
If the jury finds that the respondent requires civil 
management, the court must then decide whether he must be 
confined or put under strict and intensive supervision.  He will be 
confined only if there is clear and convincing evidence that: 
(1) his mental abnormality involves a strong predisposition to 
commit sex offenses; (2) he has an inability to control his 
behavior; and (3) that he is likely to be a danger to others if not 
confined.
 
57  If the court does not find that he must be committed, 
he will be placed under strict and intensive supervision.58  After 
an offender has been committed, he receives an annual 
examination.  Each year, a psychiatrist evaluates him and 
reports on whether he is still a dangerous sex offender requiring 
confinement.59
C. The Supreme Court’s Perspective on Civil Confinement of Sex 
Offenders 
  The offender may also petition for discharge at 
any time. 
The United States Supreme Court has specifically addressed 
civil confinement of sex offenders in two cases.  The Court’s 
analysis in these cases highlights that civil confinement laws are 
facially valid, but certain procedures and provisions may be 
addressed through as-applied challenges.  This Section  
 
 
54 Id. § 10.07(a) (stating that the trial will occur within sixty days of the 
probable cause hearing). 
55 Id.  
56 Id. § 10.07(d). This determination must be made by a unanimous jury. Id. 
57 See id. § 10.07(f). “In such case, the respondent shall be committed to a secure 
treatment facility for care, treatment, and control until such time as he or she no 
longer requires confinement.” Id. 
58 See id. “Strict and intensive supervision” is governed by section 10.11 of the 
Act. Possible requirements include electronic monitoring, global positioning satellite 
tracking, polygraph monitoring, residence restrictions, prohibition of contact with 
past or potential victims, and supervision by a parole officer. See id. § 10.11(a)(1); see 
also supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
59 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.09(b) (McKinney 2010).  
CP_Alessi (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2011  3:56 PM 
2011] WHO MAY WE DETAIN AND HOW 241 
summarizes both of the Court’s civil confinement decisions 
regarding the Kansas statute, which is similar to the New York 
Act.  
1. Kansas v. Hendricks 
In Kansas v. Hendricks,60 the Supreme Court held that 
Kansas’s Sexually Violent Predator Act61 satisfied substantive 
due process requirements for civil confinement.62  Kansas used 
the statute for the first time to commit Hendricks, who had a 
long criminal history of molesting children.63  Hendricks 
appealed his commitment, and the supreme court in the state of 
Kansas held the Act violated his substantive due process rights, 
because the Act’s definition of “mental illness” did not satisfy the 
United States Supreme Court’s “mental illness” requirement for 
involuntary commitment.64  The United States Supreme Court 
disagreed, finding that the Act did “comport[ ] with due process 
requirements.”65
In holding the Act constitutional, the Court noted that 
although individual freedom from personal restraint is a core 
liberty protected by due process, “that liberty interest is not 
absolute.”
  
66  States, in narrow circumstances, may forcibly 
commit individuals who pose a danger to society.67  Civil 
confinement of a small subclass of dangerous persons is not 
“contrary to our understanding of ordered liberty.”68
The Court also noted that the Act was civil in nature, 
rejecting Hendricks’ argument that it established criminal 
proceedings.  It stated that “[t]he categorization of a particular 
  The Court 
did not elaborate on what would be considered an adequate 
procedure to forcibly commit a dangerous individual.   
 
60 521 U.S. 346 (1997).  
61 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2008). 
62 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).  
63 See id. at 350.  
64 See id. at 356 (the majority of the Kansas Supreme Court did not address 
Hendricks’ double jeopardy or ex post facto claims).  
65 Id. at 371.  
66 Id. at 356. The Court quoted an earlier case, which warned that “[t]here are 
manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common 
good. On any other basis organized society could not exist with safety to its 
members.” Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905). 
67 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357 (explaining that the individual’s liberty interest 
may be overridden even in the civil context).   
68 Id.   
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proceeding as civil or criminal is first of all a question of 
statutory construction. . . .  [Once w]e ascertain [that] the 
legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings 
[then] we ordinarily defer to the legislature’s stated intent.”69  
Although the Court recognized that incapacitation was a goal of 
the Act, it noted that “the mere fact that a person is detained 
does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government 
has imposed punishment.”70  Here, the Court decided that the 
confinement at issue was not punitive in nature but was instead 
intended simply to “hold the person until his mental abnormality 
no longer causes him to be a threat to others.”71  The Court also 
found that even though there was no adequate treatment 
provision in the Act, “incapacitation [alone] may be a legitimate 
end of the civil law.”72
2. Kansas v. Crane 
  
Perhaps indicating the uncertainty surrounding the 
Hendricks decision, the same Kansas statute was revisited by the 
Supreme Court five years later in Kansas v. Crane.73  The Court 
once again evaluated the constitutionality of the state’s civil 
commitment law.  The issue presented this time was more 
narrow:  In order for the statute to comport with substantive due 
process, did Hendricks require that the sex offender exhibit total 
or complete lack of control over his behavior?74  The Kansas 
Supreme Court found that under Hendricks, the Constitution 
requires that the subject be completely unable to control his 
behavior.75
 
69 Id. at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted). This deference to the judgment 
of the legislature will be discussed further Part II below, in the context of the 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay.   
  The State of Kansas disagreed, arguing that the 
70 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 
746 (1987)).  
71 Id. (“This is a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective and has been 
historically so regarded.”). For a further discussion of the importance of 
incapacitation as a preventative measure see infra Part II.B.  
72 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 365–66. 
73 534 U.S. 407 (2002).  
74 Id. at 411.  
75 In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 290 (Kan. 2000).  
A fair reading of the majority opinion in Hendricks leads us to the 
inescapable conclusion that commitment under the Act is unconstitutional 
absent a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior. 
To conclude otherwise would require that we ignore the plain language of 
the majority opinion in Hendricks. Justice Thomas, speaking for the 
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Constitution does not require any lack of control determination 
in order to civilly commit an offender.76  The United States 
Supreme Court split the difference and concluded that under its 
previous decision in Hendricks, and consistent with the 
Constitution, a person could be committed under the Kansas 
statute with “proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”77  
In addition, the Court suggested that “the Constitution’s 
safeguards of human liberty in the area of mental illness and the 
law are not always best enforced through precise bright-line 
rules.”78  The Court emphasized that individual states retain 
“considerable leeway” in defining who is eligible for civil 
commitment due to mental abnormalities.79
An analysis of the two civil confinement decisions 
demonstrates a few key points, each of which will be examined 
further in this Note.  First, the Court is willing to allow states to 
craft their civil confinement statutes as their legislatures see fit.  
It states in definite terms that it will normally defer to the 
legislature in this area of the law, so long as the civil 
confinement statute meets basic due process requirements.  
Second, the Court recognizes that it is difficult to draw bright-
line rules with regard to due process and civil confinement of sex 
offenders.  In the absence of these rules, it is necessary for states 
to ensure that they draft legislation that meets the minimum 
constitutional protections of due process.  Third, the Court 
identifies incapacitation for the purpose of preventing future 
harm as a legitimate goal of civil confinement.  Each of these 
principles can be better illustrated when examined through the 




majority, stated that to be constitutional, a civil commitment must limit 
involuntary confinement to those “who suffer from a volitional impairment 
rendering them dangerous beyond their control.”  
Id. (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 (1997)). The Kansas court interpreted this 
language from Hendricks as requiring a complete or total lack of control. Id. at 288–
89. 
76 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (citing the Brief for Petitioner at 
17, Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (No. 00-957), 2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
390; Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–31, Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) 
(No. 00-957), 2001 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 58). 
77 Id. at 413.  
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
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II. HOW THE POST 9/11 DETAINEE CASES INFORM CIVIL 
CONFINEMENT 
The enemy combatant cases are relevant for analyzing New 
York’s civil confinement statute, due to similarities in the 
problems both seek to address, the related solutions crafted, and 
the comparable discourse between the judicial and political 
branches.  The Court’s enemy combatant decisions highlight 
what is insufficient for purposes of due process:  This Note 
proposes that if these deficiencies are not implicated by the New 
York statute, it follows that it is adequate for due process 
purposes.  This Part first briefly discusses the process of how sex 
offenders and enemy combatants arrive in their respective 
detentions.  It then notes the emphasis on prevention as a 
legitimate goal of incapacitation in both scenarios.  Finally, it 
sketches out how the minimum protections of due process can be 
met through a procedure specially tailored by the Executive or 
the legislature in certain circumstances.  
A. How Do Sex Offenders and Enemy Combatant Detainees “Get 
There?” 
Kansas v. Crane was decided in 2002, after September 11 but 
before the first Guantanamo Bay detainee case80
With the New York civil confinement statute, there is a 
clearly defined path for how the offender “gets there”:  He has 
been convicted of at least one designated offense in the past,
 came before the 
Court.  The Guantanamo cases are relevant for analysis of the 
New York statute, because although the Court addressed the 
Kansas statute in its civil confinement cases, it did not spell out 
exactly what a statute must avoid to be considered constitutional.  
Rather, it spoke in terms of why the Kansas statute was 
constitutional.   
81
 
80 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 
(2004) were both decided on June 28, 2004.  
 
been incarcerated and close to release, and then been deemed to 
have a mental abnormality.  After these conditions are met, and 
he goes through the civil commitment process, he is deemed a 
81 “[I]n order for a valid sex offender civil management petition to be filed, a 
respondent must have been convicted of committing a defined sex offense.” State v. 
P.H., 22 Misc. 3d 689, 705, 874 N.Y.S.2d 733, 745 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (finding that 
respondent was previously convicted of attempted rape in the first degree and sexual 
abuse in the first degree, two qualifying offenses under the Act).  
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“sex offender requiring civil management.”82  With the detainees 
at Guantanamo, it is slightly more ambiguous, but the general 
path toward being detained is a capture on the “battlefield” and 
the government’s designation of the individual as an “enemy 
combatant.”83
B. The Importance of Prevention in Both Schemes 
   
Both civil confinement laws and enemy combatant policies 
seek to prevent future harm to society by incapacitating 
dangerous individuals.  One of the recurring themes of the New 
York civil confinement statute is the need to prevent sex 
offenders from harming the community in the future.  The first 
sentence of the legislative findings states that “recidivistic sex 
offenders pose a danger to society that should be addressed 
through comprehensive programs of treatment and 
management.”84  The idea of protecting the public by addressing 
the risk of sex offenders comes up five more times in the next 
four sections of the Act:  “[C]onfinement of the most dangerous 
offenders will need to be extended by the civil process in order to 
provide them [with] treatment and to protect the public from 
their recidivist conduct.”85
 
82 See generally N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01 (McKinney 2010); see also supra 
Part I.B.  
  The Attorney General has said that 
83 There is no definitive or exclusive definition of an “enemy combatant.” 
However, in a 2004 order establishing the military teams to review detainees, it was 
stated that “[f]or purposes of this Order, the term ‘enemy combatant’ shall mean an 
individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated 
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners.” Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of 
the Navy (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/jul2004/ 
d20040707review.pdf. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court pointed out that, 
[t]here is some debate as to the proper scope of this term, and the 
Government has never provided any court with the full criteria that is uses 
in classifying individuals as such. It has made clear, however, that, for 
purposes of this case, the “enemy combatant” that it is seeking to detain is 
an individual who, it alleges, was “ ‘part of or supporting forces hostile to 
the United States or coalition partners’ ” in Afghanistan and who 
“ ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States’ ” there. 
542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) (quoting Brief for the Respondents at 3, Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 724020).  
84 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01(a).  
85 Id. § 10.01(b); see also id. (“These offenders may require long-term specialized 
treatment modalities to address their risk to reoffend.”); id. § 10.01(c) (“The goal of a 
comprehensive system should be to protect the public, [and] reduce recidivism . . . .”); 
id. § 10.01(d) (noting protection of society as a goal of civil commitment); id. 
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the system is designed to “closely supervise and treat” offenders 
who “pose a substantial risk to commit new sex crimes.”86  The 
Attorney General also notes that civil management “enhances 
public safety by filling a void”87 and provides “a new mechanism 
to protect New Yorkers from mentally abnormal and potentially 
dangerous sex offenders.”88
The Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of 
prevention in its enemy combatant cases, and its analysis 
supports New York’s stated goals in passing its civil confinement 
law.  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a plurality of the Court considered 
the government’s interest in detaining enemy combatants.
 
89  It 
found that the government’s concern in making sure enemies do 
not return to battle is “weighty and sensitive.”90  The Court 
willingly conceded that the Constitution allows for decisions 
concerning war to be made by those who are “best positioned and 
most politically accountable for making them.”91  The Court’s due 
process analysis “need not blink at those realities.”92
In his Boumediene v. Bush dissent, Justice Scalia 
emphasized a legitimate goal of confining enemy combatants at 
Guantanamo.
 
93  His discussion is constructive in the context of 
civil commitment when he stresses the importance of prevention 
in detaining enemy combatants, because many of the reasons 
that justify detaining enemy combatants also justify confining 
sexual predators.  Both groups are dangerous to society, it is 
difficult to predict the future behavior of each, and incapacitating 
these individuals seems to be the only practical way to protect 
potential victims.  Justice Scalia notes the “disastrous 
consequences” stemming from the Court’s holding that detained 
alien enemy combatants have a right to the writ of habeas corpus 
and states his fundamental disagreement with the proposition 
that the writ runs in favor of aliens abroad.94
 
§ 10.01(e) (“That the system for responding to recidivistic sex offenders with civil 
measures must be designed for . . . protection.”).  
  He then goes on to 
86 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 35, at 1. 
87 Id. at 3.  
88 Id. at 12 (concluding that after a year of being implemented, SOMTA has 
made New York communities “safer”).  
89 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
90 Id. at 531. 
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 827 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
94 Id. 
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emphasize a point important for the civil confinement issue: 
there is no real way of knowing if an enemy combatant will 
reoffend once released.95  Some enemy combatants released from 
Guantanamo “succeeded in carrying on their atrocities against 
innocent civilians.”96  This “return to the kill illustrates the 
incredible difficulty of assessing who is and who is not an enemy 
combatant . . . .”97
Despite the attempt to craft a stringent standard for civilly 
committing sex offenders in New York, it, too, is a fallible 
process.  In the end, it comes down to the judgment of mental 
health professionals, judges, and juries.  However, despite the 
inherent difficulties in predicting who will reoffend, the 
legislature has chosen to pursue civil confinement as a means of 
preventing future crimes.  Just as the military does not want 
enemy combatants returning to engage in more hostilities 
against American forces, New York does not want convicted sex 
offenders returning to society to commit more crimes.  It can be 
argued that this “impulse for prevention” is implicated by the 




New York courts have also noted the importance of 
prevention in the context of civil commitment.  The Court of 
Appeals recognized the legislature’s goal of “protect[ing] the 
community from violent sexual predators.”
 
99  In a presently 
ongoing federal case involving procedural due process challenges 
to SOMTA, it was noted that “New York . . . has a strong interest 
in ensuring the safety of potential victims of [sexual] offenses.”100
 
95 Id. at 826. 
  
Coupled with the legislature’s stated intent of using civil 
confinement as a means of protecting society, it is evident that 
the judiciary in New York recognizes prevention as a legitimate 
goal of civil confinement. 
96 Id. at 828. 
97 Id. at 829.  
98 Janus, supra note 14, at 576. 
99 State ex rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio, 7 N.Y.3d 607, 614, 859 N.E.2d 508, 512, 
825 N.Y.S.2d 702, 706 (2006).  
100 Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Spitzer, No. 07-Civ-2935, 2007 WL 4115936, 
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007) (discussing Plaintiff Mental Hygiene Legal Service’s 
motion for injunctive relief), aff’d sub nom. Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v. Paterson, 
No. 07-Civ-5548, 2009 WL 579445 (2d Cir. 2009).  
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C. How Can the Minimal Protections of Due Process Be Tailored 
for Civil Confinement? 
In responding to constitutional challenges to SOMTA, the 
federal court in Mental Hygiene Legal Service v. Spitzer101 stated 
that “[w]hen a person’s liberty interests are implicated, due 
process requires at a minimum notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.”102  However, beyond this minimum “floor” of 
constitutional protection, “[d]ue process is not a fixed concept, 
but flexible, and depends on the particular circumstances.”103  
The court also recited the traditional two-step inquiry for 
examining a due process claim:  first, whether there is a liberty 
interest that has been interfered with by the State, and, second, 
whether “the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were 
constitutionally sufficient.”104  In the case of civil confinement, 
“there is no question” as to the first inquiry—persons affected by 
the Act face a serious liberty deprivation:  Those found to be sex 
offenders requiring civil management are confined against their 
will.105
The Supreme Court has said that procedural due process 
requirements may be tailored to fit exceptional circumstances.  
In Hamdi, a Guantanamo case, a plurality of the Court held that 
a United States citizen being held within United States territory 
  The remaining question is whether the procedures 
created by the Act are constitutionally sufficient. 
 
101 In New York, the Mental Hygiene Legal Service is placed within the judicial 
branch of the government. It is responsible for protecting the rights of the mentally 
disabled and advocating for individuals regarding the status of their mental health.  
See Mental Hygiene Legal Service, NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ad4/MHLS/MHLS_default.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 
2011).  
102 Mental Hygiene Legal Serv., 2007 WL 4115936, at *5. It should be noted for 
purposes of this discussion that the District Court in New York pulled this 
particular phrasing of the due process minimum from Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, which 
stated that 
the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear:  Parties 
whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that 
they may enjoy that right they must first be notified. It is equally 
fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard must 
be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 
542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
103 Mental Hygiene Legal Serv., 2007 WL 4115936, at *4 (citing Zinermon v. 
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990)).  
104 Id. (quoting Ky. Dep’t. of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)).  
105 Id. (“Persons affected by Article 10 are threatened with deprivation not 
merely of a liberty interest, but of liberty tout court . . . .”).  
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should receive notice of the government’s factual basis for 
holding him and an opportunity to contest that basis before an 
impartial judge.106  Just as with civil confinement, the Court 
found that the private liberty interest affected by the official 
action was “the most elemental of liberty interests—the interest 
in being free from physical detention by one’s own 
government.”107  The Court concluded that the government may 
not hold a citizen indefinitely without basic due process 
protections enforceable through judicial review.108
Beyond these basic due process protections, the plurality 
found that “the exigencies of the circumstances may demand 
that, aside from these core elements, enemy-combatant 
proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon 
potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military 
conflict.”
 
109  The Court elaborated on general principles that 
should guide the executive in crafting these “tailored” 
procedures.  First, hearsay might have to be accepted as a 
reliable form of evidence from the government.110  In addition, 
the “Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in 
favor of the Government’s evidence,” as long as there was a fair 
opportunity for the detainee to rebut that presumption.111  Once 
the government puts forth credible evidence, the burden could 
shift to the detainee to challenge with “more persuasive evidence 
that he falls outside the [enemy combatant] criteria.”112  The 
plurality thought it was possible that these standards could be 
met by a “properly constituted military tribunal.”113
 
106 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.  
  However, in  
 
107 Id. at 529 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).  
108 Id. at 533. The plurality also pointed out that a “clearly established principle 
of the law of war” is that detention may last no longer than hostilities. Id. at 519. 
However, due to the nature of the “war on terror,” Hamdi’s detention “could last for 
the rest of his life.” Id. at 520. This concern has been raised, albeit in a different 
context, with civil confinement of sex offenders. See infra Part III.C.  
109 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 (emphasis added).  
110 Id. at 533–34. 
111 Id. at 534.  
112 Id. This type of burden shifting would ensure that the “errant tourist, 
embedded journalist, or local aid worker” is able to prove military error but still 
gives “due regard to the Executive.” Id. 
113 Id. at 538.  
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crafting an alternative to established habeas procedures,114
Similarly, with the New York civil confinement statute, the 
judiciary will be the final arbiter on whether the procedures are 
“good enough.”  In evaluating the constitutionality of the newly 
enacted statute, a federal district court suggested that “it is 
preferable to give the New York State courts the opportunity to 
determine the proper scope of a New York law before a federal 
court declares whether it offends the federal Constitution.”
 
Congress will ultimately be told by the Court what is “good 
enough” to be an adequate substitution.  
115  
The federal court also noted the role of judicial restraint in 
evaluating a statute passed by the legislature:  If it is 
“conceivable that the statute may be susceptible to constitutional 
application,” the court will be hesitant to invalidate it on a facial 
level.116  Chief Justice Roberts echoed this preference for a 
restrained judicial role in his Boumediene dissent.  He chided the 
majority that “we ought not to pass on questions of 
constitutionality . . . unless such [questions are] unavoidable.”117
Much of the Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding enemy 
combatants has been marked by a back and forth with the 
political branches.  In Boumediene, the Court deferred to the 
legislature when it considered the legislative history of enemy 
combatant statutes.  It found that “this ongoing dialogue between 
and among the branches of Government . . . [should] be 
respected.”
 
118  This parallels the “dialogue” between the New 
York government and the Court of Appeals leading up to the 
passage of SOMTA.119
 
114 The federal habeas statute states that “Writs of habeas corpus may be 
granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006 & Supp. II).  
  In each instance, the judiciary and the 
government are involved in a “conversation”:  the legislature 
initiates it with a law, the court responds with an opinion.  
115 Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Spitzer, No. 07-Civ-2935, 2007 WL 4115936, 
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007) (“Depending upon how New York courts interpret 
their own statute, there may be no need to reach any federal constitutional issue.”), 
aff’d sub nom. Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v. Paterson, No. 07-Civ-5548, 2009 WL 
579445 (2d Cir. 2009).  
116 Id. at *10–11.  
117 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 805 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Spector Motor Serv. Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 
101, 105 (1944).  
118 Id. at 738 (majority opinion).  
119 See supra Part I.A. 
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Depending on the court’s response, the legislature may have to 
amend the law.  Despite the government’s power to start the 
dialogue, the judiciary has the final say in the conversation. 
III. CHALLENGES TO CIVIL CONFINEMENT AND DETAINEE 
RESPONSES 
This Part summarizes a few of the actual and potential 
challenges to New York’s civil confinement statute.  The actual 
challenges are those currently being raised through litigation; 
potential challenges are informed by the experiences of other 
states and the commentary criticizing civil commitment statutes 
generally. 
A. Non-Judicial Determinations and Deficient Evidence 
Standards 
One challenge to New York’s statute might be that a non-
judicial body, the case review team from OMH, exercises power 
over the confinement decision.  Using the enemy combatant 
cases, the appropriate response is that since that decision is 
reviewed by both a judge and a jury, due process requirements 
are met.  In both civil confinement and enemy combatant 
proceedings, a non-judicial body has authority over the detention 
decision.  With civil confinement, the OMH and a case review 
team provide the initial review of the respondent’s file.  There 
must be a panel of at least fifteen members, at least three of 
whom must evaluate each case.  Two members must be mental 
health professionals with experience in the treatment, diagnosis, 
risk assessment, or management of sex offenders.120
The parallel non-judicial body in enemy combatant cases is 
the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”).  CSRTs are 
composed of three members of the military, none of whom was 
involved in the apprehension of the detainee.
  With 
SOMTA, the case review team is the first step in the chain.  Its 
recommendation is ultimately considered by both a judge in the 
probable cause hearing and a jury in the trial. 
121
 
120 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.05(a) (McKinney 2010).  
  The Supreme 
Court’s most recent detainee case did not explicitly endorse or 
121 See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of 
the Navy (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/jul2004/ 
d20040707review.pdf. 
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reject the CSRTs.122  Although it held that the Detainee 
Treatment Act (“DTA”) passed by Congress was an inadequate 
substitute for habeas, it did not “endeavor to offer a 
comprehensive summary of the requisites” of a sufficient 
procedure.123  The Court expressly made “no judgment [as to] 
whether the CSRTs, as currently constituted, satisfy due process 
standards.”124  It did, however, identify some deficiencies.  First, 
it noted that it was difficult for the detainee to rebut the factual 
basis for the Government’s assertion that he was an enemy 
combatant.125  He was allowed to present “reasonably available 
evidence,” but his ability was limited by his confinement.126  
Next, he was not permitted the assistance of counsel127 but rather 
had a “personal representative.”128  The Court backpedaled from 
its Hamdi suggestion that hearsay evidence is acceptable in this 
context and found that the admission of hearsay makes the 
“detainee’s opportunity to question witnesses . . . more 
theoretical than real.”129
Since the Court did not offer its view of what would 
constitute an adequate habeas procedure in Boumediene, the 
political branches were left to deduce what it requires.  However, 
it is logical to assume that if the aforementioned deficiencies 
make the DTA inadequate, the inclusion of these safeguards 
would make the procedure adequate.  
 
 Provisions of SOMTA state that the Attorney General has 
the burden of showing that the respondent requires confinement, 
and the respondent is allowed to contest the factual basis of the 
state’s assertion at the trial.130
 
122 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008) (holding that non-citizen 
detainees had the right to the writ of habeas corpus).  
  He may employ his own  
 
123 Id. at 779.  
124 Id. at 785.  
125 See id. at 767. 
126 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
127 Id. at 783–84. 
128 A personal representative is a designated military officer with appropriate 
security clearance who assists the detainee with the review process. See 
Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy 
(July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/jul2004/d20040707review. 
pdf. The representative may share information with the detainee unless it is 
classified. Id. 
129 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 784. 
130 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.07(d) (Mckinney 2010). 
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psychiatric evaluator.131
Finally, in the New York civil confinement statute, the case 
review team does the initial review and does not make a final 
decision.  A judicial body ultimately reviews its recommendation.  
In Rasul v. Bush,
  Additionally, at all stages of the process, 
he is represented by counsel.  The DTA deficiencies of 
Boumediene are not present with SOMTA.   
132 the Court went through a lengthy discussion 
of habeas corpus and came to the conclusion that “the federal 
courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the 
Executive’s potentially indefinite detention of individuals who 
claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing.”133
B. These Are Criminal Procedures Couched in Civil Terms 
  After this 
decision, the judiciary was able to exercise control over enemy 
combatant determinations, just as a judicial body has authority 
over the OMH civil confinement recommendation.  
Another potential challenge to the New York statute is that 
it couches criminal provisions in civil terms.  Civil confinement 
law has been criticized as being “a criminal wolf in a civil sheep’s 
clothing.”134  It has been argued that overly broad statutes “blur 
the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings.”135  The 
response from the detainee cases is that in order to promote 
safety, procedures may be tailored, and the judiciary will defer to 
the legislature’s judgment so long as the statute may be 
construed constitutionally.  In Hendricks, the Supreme Court 
rejected the argument that the Kansas civil confinement statute 
was criminal in nature.136
 
131 Id. § 10.09(b). 
  In New York, there have been 
challenges to the Act that raise the question of whether certain 
provisions are more criminal than civil.  In responding to one of 
these challenges, a district court judge found that the criminal 
tone of the statute necessitated a closer look at one of its 
132 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
133 Id. at 485. 
134 Steven I. Friedland, On Treatment, Punishment and the Civil Confinement of 
Sex Offenders, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 73, 115 (1999). 
135 See Pfaffenroth, supra note 15, at 2251 (proposing that civil commitment 
justifications create a “slippery slope” that might be used to allow confinement of 
other types of criminals).  
136 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997). 
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provisions.137  Section 10.07(d) authorizes civil confinement of 
individuals who were charged with sex offenses but were unable 
to stand trial, due to mental incapacitation.  At the civil 
commitment trial, if the Attorney General can prove by “clear 
and convincing evidence . . . that respondent did engage in the 
conduct constituting [the sex] offense,” he can be committed.138  
The court noted the Hendricks proposition that a legislature’s 
assertion that the statute is civil in nature may be overcome only 
when it is clear that it is punitive either in nature or effect.  
Here, the court found that the wording139 and purpose of the 
statute necessitated a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
individual had actually committed the qualifying sex offense.140
The enemy combatant proceedings are concerned with 
criminal acts and penalties.  However, Hamdi provides crucial 
guidance in its proposition that the judiciary should defer to the 
legislature to craft procedures as they see fit, so long as the 
procedures meet the minimum due process requirements, in 
either the civil or criminal contexts.  As discussed earlier, the 
Hamdi plurality found that the executive could tailor the enemy 
combatant proceedings to meet the special needs of the military 
without running afoul of due process requirements.
 
141  In his 
Hamdi dissent, Justice Thomas went so far as to say that the 
executive branch has plenary powers to detain enemy 
combatants even without hearings.142  He emphasized the 
practical reality that the judiciary did not have the “expertise 
and capacity” to second-guess the executive branch’s 
determination that an individual required detention.143
 
137 See Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Spitzer, No. 07-Civ.-2935, 2007 WL 
4115936, at *17–21 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007), aff’d sub nom. Mental Hygiene Legal 
Servs. v. Paterson, No. 07-Civ-5548, 2009 WL 579445 (2d Cir. 2009).  
  Although 
Thomas’s conclusion may be extreme, his argument that “no 
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the 
138 Id. at *17 (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.09 
(Mckinney 2010)).  
139 In particular, the court emphasized the use of the words “offender” and 
“recidivist,” concluding that they have “clear criminal implications.” Id. at *19. It 
also found that the statute expresses “moral condemnation” that is “normally 
reserved for criminal judgments.” Id.  
140 Id. at *21.  
141 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).  
142 Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
143 Id. 
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Nation”144 is convincing when grounded in the Supreme Court’s 
recognition that the community’s interest in safety can outweigh 
an individual’s liberty interest.145
C. Chances for Release Are Slim 
 
Many argue that civil commitment of sex offenders amounts 
to an indefinite confinement.146  The response from the detainee 
cases is that as long as individuals have an adequate basis to 
challenge their detention, due process requirements are satisfied.  
In New York, as in many other states, confined offenders have a 
statutory basis to challenge their detention annually.147  SOMTA 
requires that each individual be examined “at least once every 
year” by a state psychiatric examiner.148  At the same time, the 
individual also has “the right to be evaluated by an independent 
psychiatric examiner.”149  In addition, the subject may petition 
the court “at any time” for release from a secure facility into 
strict and intensive supervision and treatment.150
Some of the federal statutes and procedures regarding 
enemy combatants had similar provisions for periodic review of 
an enemy combatant’s status.  The DTA was enacted in response 
to the Court’s 2004 decision in Hamdi.  Congress seemed to be 
following the advice of the plurality, who had suggested that an 
appropriately authorized, proper military tribunal could meet the 
Court’s articulated due process minimums.
   
151
 
144 Id. at 580 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)).  
  The DTA required 
the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual report to Congress, 
detailing its review procedures and the number of detainees 
145 See id. at 591 (noting that “the Due Process Clause ‘lays down [no] 
categorical imperative’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987))).  
146 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 
VA. L. REV. 1025, 1034 (2002) (“Substantive due process requires a . . . workable 
limiting standard to justify the massive deprivation of liberty that indefinite 
involuntary civil commitment imposes.”); Edward P. Ra, Note, The Civil 
Confinement of Sexual Predators: A Delicate Balance, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 335, 352 (2007) (“Since civil confinement laws involve a deprivation of 
liberty for an indefinite period of time, the due process clause protections must be 
met.”).  
147 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.09 (McKinney 2010) (annual examinations 
and petitions for discharge).  
148 Id. § 10.09(b). 
149 Id.  
150 Id. § 10.09(f).  
151 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004). 
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reviewed.152  The decisions of the CSRTs were explicitly 
reviewable by the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia.153  In his Boumediene dissent, Chief Justice Roberts 
emphasized that the DTA expressly directs the Secretary of 
Defense to review any new evidence pertaining to the enemy 
combatant status of a detainee.154  There must be a yearly review 
of each prisoner’s status to “afford every detainee the opportunity 
‘to explain why he is no longer a threat to the United States.’ ”155  
The Boumediene Court’s problem with the review of new 
evidence was that on its face, the DTA did not allow the 
reviewing Court of Appeals to consider evidence outside the 
CSRT record.156  Roberts disagreed with this “hand wringing” of 
the Court because he found that it declared the evidence issue 
unconstitutional with reference only to abstract hypotheticals.157
It is fair to say that the procedural opportunities for annual 
review in SOMTA would fall within the Boumediene Court’s 
allowable limits.  Once the subject is evaluated by a psychiatric 
professional, the report is sent to OMH.
 
158  If the subject cannot 
afford his own evaluator, the court will appoint him one of his 
choice.159  After reviewing the new report, and the rest of the 
subject’s file, OMH makes “a determination in writing as to 
whether the respondent is currently a dangerous sex offender 
requiring confinement.”160
 
152 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1405(d), 119 Stat. 
3136 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., and 
42 U.S.C.). Boumediene later held that the Detainee Treatment Act was not an 
adequate substitute for habeas, but this was not based on the annual review 
procedures alone. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 728–30 (2008). 
  If the respondent petitions for a 
hearing, it is held within forty-five days.  If the reviewing court 
finds that there is a substantial issue as to whether he still 
153 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 803 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
154 Id. at 801 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Today the Court strikes down as 
inadequate the most generous set of procedural protections ever afforded aliens 
detained by this country as enemy combatants.”).  
155 Id. at 821 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 
U.S. 723 (2008) (No. 06-1196), 2007 WL 671010).  
156 Id. at 789 (majority opinion). 
157 Id. at 821–22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). “The Court’s new method of 
constitutional adjudication only underscores its failure to follow our usual 
procedures and require petitioners to demonstrate that they have been harmed by 
the statute they challenge.” Id. at 821–22.  
158 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.09 (McKinney 2010).  
159 Id. 
160 Id. § 10.09(b) (emphasis added).  
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requires confinement, an evidentiary hearing is held.  Unlike the 
enemy combatant proceedings, where the government’s basis has 
a presumption of validity, in this evidentiary hearing, the 
Attorney General has the burden of proof.161  The respondent will 
continue to be confined only if the court finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that he requires it.162
D. Notice and Opportunity To Be Heard Are Lacking in Certain 
Provisions 
 
One of the challenged provisions in SOMTA is section 
10.06(f),163 which authorizes detention of a sexual offender before 
the probable cause hearing stage of the commitment proceedings.  
In Mental Hygiene Legal Service,164 Plaintiff Mental Hygiene 
Legal Service (“MHLS”) argued that this provision violates the 
“most basic tenets of due process”:  notice and opportunity to 
challenge the detention.165  The court found that the statute did 
not require notice be given to the respondent in advance of his 
detention by a securing petition.166  It also agreed with Plaintiff 
MHLS that it gives the individual no opportunity to contest the 
petition and thus, detention.167
 
161 Id. § 10.09(d).  
  Though the court recognized that 
this provision might empower an executive branch official to 
order an individual detained beyond his sentence, it declined to  
 
 
162 Id. § 10.09(h). 
163 New York Mental Hygiene Law provides: 
[I]f it appears that the respondent may be released prior to the time the 
case review team makes a determination, and the attorney general 
determines that the protection of public safety so requires, the attorney 
general may file a securing petition at any time after [the respondent’s] 
receipt of written notice. . . . In such circumstance, there shall be no 
probable cause hearing until such time as the case review team may find 
that the respondent is a sex offender requiring civil management. If the 
case review team determines that the respondent is not a sex offender 
requiring civil management, the attorney general shall so advise the court 
and the securing petition shall be dismissed. 
Id. § 10.06(f). 
164 No. 07-Civ-2935, 2007 WL 4115936 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007), aff’d sub nom. 
Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v. Paterson, No. 07-Civ-5548, 2009 WL 579445 (2d Cir. 
2009). 
165 Id. at *7, *11 (declining to deem the provision facially unconstitutional). This 
case is still being litigated.  
166 Id. at *7. 
167 Id. at *7–8. 
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declare the provision facially unconstitutional, because “the 
present record [did] not demonstrate that the statute cannot be 
administered or interpreted in a way to avoid these problems.”168
Unlike the Guantanamo detainees, many of whom have 
faced six years without judicial oversight,
 
169 the sex offenders 
affected by section 10.06(f) will be granted a probable cause 
hearing within seventy-two hours of the securing petition.170  The 
court in Mental Hygiene Legal Service also found it relevant that 
in the first six months of the statute’s passage, securing petitions 
were only used twice.  The court took this as an indication that 
the Attorney General was not abusing the process.171
Another potential challenge might arise with regard to notice 
under SOMTA.  Many of the provisions setting deadlines for the 
Attorney General contain an “out” clause.  In these instances, the 
Attorney General’s failure to give notice within the psrescribed 
time does not affect the validity of the notice and also does not 
impair any subsequent action.
   
172
IV. CONCLUSION 
  However, the detainee cases 
illustrate that so long as an individual has a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard, due process requirements are met.  With 
SOMTA, the respondent is given the opportunity to challenge his 
confinement in both the probable cause hearing and the trial. If 
the Attorney General’s office abuses its discretion in filing 
papers, the judiciary is able to respond and perhaps change its 
interpretation the permissive language of the statute. 
Civil confinement of sex offenders is not without controversy.  
As suggested already, the proper scope of the Sex Offender 
Management and Treatment Act will be defined in the courts.173
 
168 Id. at *10. In explaining the plaintiff’s burden on a facial challenge, the court 
declared facial invalidation “an extraordinary remedy” that is “generally disfavored.” 
Id. This type of challenge will only succeed if there is “no set of circumstances under 
which the challenged practices would be constitutional.” Id.  
  
There must be a careful balancing of interests between the 
169 See Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723, 729–30 (2008) (finding that the case 
for requiring detainees to exhaust administrative review before a habeas corpus 
hearing would be “much stronger” if the individuals had only been waiting a short 
period of time).  
170 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.06(h) (McKinney 2010).  
171 Mental Hygiene Legal Serv., 2007 WL 4115936, at *11. 
172 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.05(b), (g), 10.06(a).  
173 See Mental Hygiene Legal Serv., 2007 WL 4115936, at *11. 
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liberty of the confined individual and the safety of the 
community.  With recognition of this balance, the Supreme Court 
has ruled that civil confinement is constitutional.  It did so in the 
context of a Kansas statute, similar to the New York Act.  
Despite these rulings, the civil confinement issue is still 
controversial.   
More guidance is necessary to determine whether the New 
York statute’s procedures are adequate.  With enemy 
combatants, a similar weighing of liberty and safety occurs.  The 
Supreme Court’s take on enemy combatants illustrates that so 
long as the procedures used to accomplish legitimate 
governmental goals comport with the minimum floor of due 
process, the legislature is free to address the issue as it sees fit.  
The government may tailor proceedings to meet unique 
circumstances.  More specifically, by identifying due process 
deficiencies in the enemy combatant procedures, the detainee 
cases illustrate what is unacceptable.  Challenges to the New 
York statute can be met with a thoughtful response from these 
detainee cases.  By holding New York’s statute to these 
standards, and using the enemy combatant cases as a framework 
for analysis, it becomes evident that its established procedures 
are constitutional.  
 
